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EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Low coral islands are heavily dependent on
groundwater for freshwater supplies. The
availability, quality, and management of
groundwater are central to sustainable
development and poverty alleviation in many
developing small island nations. The declaration
by the Government of Kiribati of water reserves
on the atoll of Tarawa, over privately owned land,
has lead to conflicts, illegal settlements and
vandalism of public assets. Beside, the water
consumption per capita tends to increase towards
western-like
standards,
threatening
the
sustainability of the actual exploitation system.
Finally, pollution generated by the 45 000
habitants of South Tarawa has already
contaminated all the freshwater lenses, with the
exception of the existing reserves so far.

They have the potential to greatly reduce conflict
over natural resource management and resource
allocation. In order to collect, understand and
merge viewpoints coming from different
stakeholders, the following 3-stage methodology
is applied: collecting local and expert knowledge,
blending the different viewpoints into a gamebased model, playing the game with the different
stakeholders in order to explore different scenarii
and their simulated outcomes.
Although game sessions delivered successful
outcomes, the final stage of the project is
characterised by the upheaval of contradictory
Government stands that undermine the whole
process. It is argued that heterogeneous
viewpoints may be handled in a satisfactory
manner during the gaming sessions, but that longterm hidden agendas may override the outcomes.
Beyond the inherent question of legitimacy
attached to such approaches, it is clear, from our
experience, that some players – especially those
representing Government or supra-national
institutions – have to deal with constraints that are
often genuinely first considered as external to the
on-going negotiation process.

Our project, called AtollGame, aims at providing
the relevant information to the local actors,
including institutional and local community
representatives in order to facilitate the dialogue
and devise together sustainable and equitable
water management practices. Multi-Agent Based
Simulations (MABS) coupled with a Role-Playing
Game have been implemented to fulfil this aim.
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1.

western-like
standards,
threatening
the
sustainability of the actual exploitation system.
With an estimated 50% losses, the reticulated
system is unable to meet the demand. Water is
therefore supplied for only a few hours per day as
a de facto demand management tool. Only a
limited number of households have adopted rain
harvesting technologies. Unfortunately, roof
installations are often poorly managed (Carpenter
et. al., 2002). Traditional wells remain an
essential source of freshwater although they are
anything but reliable. They are excavated close to
the dwellings, very often located next to the
lagoon-side shore. Hence, during extended
drought spells, freshwater lenses shrink and the
wells become increasingly brackish.

INTRODUCTION

Low coral islands are heavily dependent on
groundwater for freshwater supplies. The
availability, quality, and management of
groundwater are central to sustainable
development and poverty alleviation in many
developing small island nations. Increasing
populations, growing per capita demand and
restricted land areas limit water availability and
generate conflicts (Falkland and Brunel 1993).
This study is carried out in the Republic of
Kiribati, on the low-lying atoll of Tarawa (see
Fig.1). The water resources are predominantly
located in freshwater lenses on the largest islands
of the atoll. The water table is typically 0.8 to
1.6m below ground surface. South Tarawa is the
capital and main population centre of the
Republic. Pollution generated by its 45 000
habitants has already contaminated most of the
freshwater lenses. Hence, the water supply for
South Tarawa inhabitants is pumped from
horizontal infiltration galleries in protection zones
with restricted access called « water reserves », on
Bonriki and Buota islands. The galleries,
connected to a reticulation system provide fresh
water via individual taps all along South Tarawa.
The Public Utility Board (PUB) is the
Government owned corporation in charge of the
water exploitation and water supply for South
Tarawa.

Landownership and traditional landuse rights are
central issues in the establishment of water
reserves. As a matter of fact, land provides
groundwater, food, attendant fishing rights and
cash income from coprah harvesting (Jones,
1997). Traditional landownership includes
underground resources, a fact poorly appreciated
when water reforms were proposed. Thus, the
creation of water reserves has lead to conflicts,
illegal settlements and vandalism of public assets
(White et al., 1999). Payment of adequate
compensation and restricted landuse are
continuing contentious issues. Wider communities
regard designated water reserves as common pool
resources that can be easily plundered.
The Government of Kiribati has obtained in 1999
a loan from the Asian Development Bank in order
to finance the US $10.24 million SAPHE project
(SAnitation, Public Health and Environment).
This project aims at improving the exploitation,
distribution and sanitation system on South
Tarawa. It is driven by a Steering Committee
involving the PUB, the Ministry of Works and
Energy, the Ministry of Environment, the
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, and
the Land Department. On the exploitation side, it
was proposed to rehabilitate and extend the
existing water reserves. Hence intensive
groundwater investigations were conducted on the
islands of Abatao and Tabiteuea (north of Bonriki
and Buota) in order to delineate the freshwater
lenses and to provide accurate estimates of the
sustainable water yields. Although previous
reports insisted on the necessity to take into
account the social impact of the new water
reserves - in order to avoid the problems
encountered on Bonriki and Buota - not much
attention was given to this issue. As a
consequence, contrasted viewpoints arose within

Figure 1: Tarawa Atoll. Bonriki and Buota
islands are on the lower right of the atoll
The water reserves currently supply about 1300
m3/day, equivalent to about 30L/capita/day of
freshwater, representing 60% of the needs of
South Tarawa’s communities. The water
consumption per capita tends to increase towards
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the Steering Committee regarding the legitimacy
of these water reserves when cost-efficiency,
social impacts and long-term sustainability were
to be compared with alternate solutions.

fundamental characteristic is the ability of the
RPG to generate collective scenarios that will
explore new management avenues. In order to
achieve these tasks, the RPG must represent
simplified features and processes encountered in
the reality. In particular, biophysical processes,
social interactions and spatial descriptions should
be understood and accepted by all players as
plausible assumptions. The RPG must also secure,
at every stage of the game, the neutrality of the
selected rules and of the Game-Master decisions.
This “fair game” is instrumental in helping
players to build self-confidence and to advocate
their viewpoints. The RPG should create
opportunities for players to comment, modify and
improve the rules. Indeed, the game is
intentionally designed with a rudimentary set of
rules that needs improvement. Thus, players come
progressively from playing against each other to a
situation where they appropriate the game
collectively.

Addressing a demand from the Ministry of Works
and Energy seeking for new participatory
approaches, our project aims at providing the
relevant information to the local actors, including
institutional and local community representatives
in order to facilitate the dialogue and devise
together sustainable and equitable water
management practices. A Role-Playing Game
coupled with an computer-based simulator is
implemented in order to fulfil this aim. This
coupled approach provides powerful means for
studying interactions between societies and their
environment (Bousquet et. al. 2002). It has
demonstrated its capacity to promote discussion
amongst stakeholders with contrasted and
eventually conflicting viewpoints (D’Aquino et.
al., 2003). The success of the approach is
inherently correlated with the ability of the
players to identify their own mental constructs
with the game’s features. Thus, it appears
essential to format the game according to
stakeholders’ standpoints. However, Becu et. al.
(2003) showed that using knowledge elicitation
techniques to infer formal ontologies was
anything but trivial.

Finally, when players have realized the collective
benefit of the game, they tend to explore more
complex situations and to implement many more
rules. Most of the time, the increasing complexity
tends to bring together the artificial game and the
real environment. What is at stake with this
approach is to give stakeholders the capacity to
build their future together. Of course,
manipulation, lobbying, struggle for power are
inherently part of the process, but in an armless
and controlled environment.

Dray et al. (2004, in press) describe the
methodology developed to collect, understand and
merge viewpoints coming from different
stakeholders in order to build a shared
representation of the system through a conceptual
model using Unified Modeling Language (UML).
Applying a semi-automatic process using
qualitative analysis softwares, it is possible to
create from individual and fragmented narratives,
a collective and consensual UML-based
representation of the system. The common
representation is used to build the essential
elements of the role-playing game while
conflicting issues are incorporated into the
flexible design of the playing sessions.
2.

2.2 Game boards and virtual landscape
The set of the game is composed of two maps
displayed on separated tables. Both maps
represent a 80 acres virtual island, based on a
regular spatial grid with hexagonal cells.
Concurrently,
a
similar
computer-based
environment is created with VisualWorks©, using
the CORMAS© platform (Bousquet et al., 1998).
These environments include generic features
without direct references to actual islands in order
to avoid any threatening feeling among players.

Conception of the computer-assisted RPG

Island 1 (Fig. 2) corresponds to a scarcely
populated island (50 families) where the
government is already pumping freshwater. The
water reserve is delineated with a red line and
pumping galleries are explicitly represented.
Island 2 (Fig. 2) corresponds to an overcrowded
island (200 families), already polluted and
equipped with a distribution pipe for drinking
water.

2.1 Conceptual framework
The RPG is designed as a medium of
communication based on the existing conceptual
model. It is meant for opening or developing the
communication between stakeholders. In a welldesigned RPG, players are aware of the issues at
stake but allow themselves to express their views
and behave accordingly to their beliefs. Another
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Galleries +
pumping station

Players

Land stripe

depth of the freshwater lens and the thickness of
the transition zone from the recharge and uptake
values, according to the maximum length of the
lens (radius). Two strong assumptions limit the
use of this simple 2D model: (1) the recharge is
constant, and (2) the lens is in a steady-state
condition. Hence, the model is often used for
long-term predictions based on ten years averaged
data. This 2D model was modified into a 3D-like
simulator using the isotropic properties of the
mesh (Perez et al., 2003). To do so, some cells
were selected and designated as lens nucleus,
surrounded
by
concentric
circles
of
isopiezometric cells. The orthogonal distance
between the lagoon and ocean shores, crossing a
nucleus gives the value of the corresponding
radius (L). The elongated lens is approximated by
a succession of these elementary units. The global
volume of the lens corresponds to overlapping
bowls.
For a given cell, the freshwater thickness is given
by the attribute depth. The hydrogeological model
calculates each individual depth after averaging
inputs and outputs over the whole freshwater lens.
This attribute is then used to specify the water
quality by updating the cell’s attribute
“wellWaterQuality” according to a simple rule: if
the depth is lower than 1.6m, the water is
considered salty, if the depth is higher than 3.1m
the water is considered fresh, and in between the
water is declared brackish. This salinity index is
visually accessible to the players at any time.

Figure 2: Island 1 (top) and Island 2 (bottom)
2.3 Water
models

balance

and

hydro-geological

Biophysical processes and landuse dynamics are
encapsulated into the computer-based simulator.
According to the field interviews, freshwater
lenses were perceived as global and undivided
resources on each island. Water infiltration into
the soil was acknowledged by a majority of
interviewees. Runoff was not a concern due to the
very high permeability of the coral-sand soils.
Water
uptake
by
vegetation
and
evapotranspiration processes were far less
perceived. Therefore, we opted for a simple
reservoir-like water balance model for our
computer-based simulator. The model, called
WATBAL (Falkland, 1992), uses 10-day period
values of rainfall and potential evapotranspiration
(PET). The first reservoir intercepts the rainfall at
the vegetation level ; the second reservoir
corresponds to the unsaturated soil storage and the
third reservoir corresponds to the freshwater lens.
Recharge of the lens may occur only after plants
have satisfied their water requirements. Pumping
galleries, traditonal wells, and coconut trees are
able to extract water directly from the lens. Using
the Cellular Automata capacities of our simulator,
the water balance is calculated for each cell
allowing the spatial heterogeneity of the processes
and their time dependence to be taken into
account.

2.4 Players
According to the field interviews, the connection
between land tenure issues and water
management was a paramount element in the
negotiations with the government. Beside, the
population increase - mainly through immigration
- was perceived as a threat in terms of water
consumption, global pollution and pressure on the
land. Thus, it was decided to design the game
around land and water allocation conflicting rules.
Each player, at the beginning of the game,
becomes a local landowner having to
accommodate an increasing number of incoming
settlers.
Each game board welcomes 8 players in order to
facilitate playful interactions. This even number
of players does not respect the real population
densities in North and South Tarawa. These
differences were taken into account with the
creation of Household entities unevenly
distributed among the two islands. They are
represented by red pawns on the game boards.
The corresponding agents in the computer-based

The shape and the depth of the freshwater lens is
calculated according to the model proposed by
Volker et al. (1985). This model predicts the
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simulator
relatives.

are

divided

into

landowners

or

of the hydrogeological model, the computer-based
simulator ran on a 10-day time step basis.
Therefore, one round in the game accounts for 9
time steps in the model.

Field interviews also showed that financial issues
linked with water management mainly dealt with
land leases, equipment investment and, seldom,
with water pricing. Thus, it was necessary to
allocate different types of income to the players in
order to activate these mechanisms. Players can
either be public servant, seamen or unemployed
and are given corresponding tokens at the
beginning of each round. The relatives settling on
their land can cost the players money or provide
some additional income. At the beginning of the
game, each player randomly draws a card that
defines his/her personal profile in the game: land
location, type of job, and family size.

2.7 Playing rounds
During the first session, dedicated to individual
strategies, players have to accommodate new
relatives on their land and adjust their income
correspondingly. According to their available
cash, they may choose to invest on new water
equipments and/or decide to crop. The raining
conditions influence groundwater salinity, storage
in rainwater tanks and crop yields. This session
allows players to perceive the impact of the
location on their well’s water quality: the closer to
the lagoon or ocean side, the saltier groundwater
becomes during drought periods. At the end of the
first session, one player on Island 1 is given the
opportunity to sell part of his land to a new
(virtual) settler, he can accept or not. At the same
time, on Island 2, one player is given the
opportunity to leave his land and to relocate on
Island 1 if he can make a deal with another player
on that island. This is meant to introduce the first
interaction between the two tables.

2.5 Players’ objective
Players are given the task to provide enough
water to their family at each round in order to
minimize the number of angry or sick people in
their house. People become angry if they didn’t
have enough water to drink and sick if they drank
unhealthy water (salty or polluted). Spatially
distributed salination processes are calculated and
displayed by the computer-based simulator. As far
as pollution processes remain conflictual among
stakeholders, it was decided to introduce them as
an arbitrary Pollution event during the game.

The second session is dedicated to collective
decision-making. On Island 1, the game master
mentions the fact that the government has decided
to get rid of all the settlers and crops located on
the reserve. Players have to relocate their relatives
and they loose the removed crops. On Island 2,
the government has decided to raise a connection
fee from each dwelling connected to the pipe. One
player, selected randomly, is given the task to
fulfil the government decisions and becomes a
“Water Agency” player. As such, he freely
negotiates with players on both islands.

In order to provide drinking water to their
families, players are given buckets at the
beginning of the game that can store 20 L/day
roughly equivalent to daily individual needs. On
purpose, the initial number of buckets is lower
then the players’ needs. Thus, they have to buy
equipments (pump, rainwater tank or PUB tank)
that will increase their storing capacity. Usually,
the rainwater tanks and PUB tanks automatically
refill at the end of each round unless insufficient
rainfall occurs. Players can decide to farm
vegetable gardens in order to increase their
income providing they have enough money and
sufficient water storing capacity for irrigation at
each round. The profit from the crop depends on
the climate.

3.

IMPLEMENTATION
OF
COMPUTER-ASSISTED RPG

THE

3.1 Convocation
In April 2004, the 2-day workshop held in Tarawa
gathered 16 representatives: 1 from the Public
Utility Board, 1 from the Ministry of
Environment, 1 from the SAPHE project, 1 from
the Land Department and 3 from each of the
concerned islands (Bonriki, Buota, Abatao and
Tabiteuea). For the representatives of the
aforementioned islands, the selection was entirely
handled by the local communities, taking into
account only two requests from our project team:
(i) selecting outspoken individuals and (ii)
expressing contrasted viewpoints within the

2.6 Duration
The game consists in 2 sessions of four rounds,
each equivalent to a 3-month season. Initially, on
Island 1, the pumping rate from the government is
steady and corresponds to a 150 m3/day. On
Island 2, the government is providing the local
residents 150 m3/day through the pipe. As a
matter of fact, in order to secure the consistency
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community. A formal invitation was sent to
members of the SAPHE Steering Committee.
They were given the choice to come themselves
or to delegate the task to another representative of
their Ministry. Only one out of four (i.e. the
SAPHE Project manager) came, all others chose
to delegate.

Finally, the Game Master introduced the fact that
the Water Agency was no longer able to maintain
the reticulated system due to a poor recovery of
the service fees. It had for immediate
consequence a sharp decrease of the water
quantity offered on Island 2. At this stage, all
players gathered around Island 1 and entered a
collective debate on the water reserve
management. Consequently, players were asked
to go back to their table and to list solutions to
improve the situation on their island. When the
two lists were completed, the Game Master
helped the participants to build a flowchart of
financial, technical and social solutions (Fig.3),
taking into account issues from both islands.

3.2 Outcomes
At first, it was encouraging to see that
representatives from the different islands
displayed different viewpoints about the Water
Reserves. On the institutional side, the position of
the different officers attending the workshop
demonstrated a clear commitment to the project.
All the participants showed the same level of
motivation either to express their views on the
issue or to genuinely try to listen to other
viewpoints. Participants also accepted to follow
the rules proposed by the Game Master,
especially the necessity to look at the problem
from a broader perspective.

3.3 Exploring scenarios
A collective analysis of the flowchart concluded
that the actual situation was largely unsustainable
either from a financial or social viewpoint: The
Government relies on the Land Leases (top part of
the flowchart) in order to secure social acceptance
of the Water Reserves. The land market already
pushes land prices to levels that can’t be matched
by Government Leases. Beside, other technical
solutions
(Desalination
plants,
improved
distribution) are not yet directly linked with the
water exploitation issues on the islands.

During the first session, the players quickly
handled the game and entered into interpersonal
discussions and comparisons. Most players
experienced the fact that individual strategies
were strongly dependent on environmental
uncertainties. Interaction between the two tables
started when one player from the Island 2 was
given the opportunity to move to Island 1. The
bargaining process that emerged from this new
situation illustrated the actual tensions existing, in
the reality, around the land tenure market. The
connection between water management and land
allocation issues was clearly demonstrated by the
players’ behaviour.
The second day, the introduction of a Water
Agency and the selection of its Director created a
little tension among the participants. But, after a
while, the players accepted the new situation as a
gaming scenario and started to interact with the
newly created institution. On Island 1, the
decision to remove crops and settlers from the
Water Reserve immediately generated vivid
discussions among players. On Island 2, the
recovery of service fees from the players
connected to the distribution pipe had the same
effect. At that stage, players started to merge
arguments based on the game with other ones
coming directly from the reality. On Island 1,
players entered direct negotiations with the
Director of the Water Agency. On Island 2,
discussions opposed players willing or not to pay
the fee.

Figure 3: Flowchart of financial, technical and
social solutions
The flowchart above provides a set of interdependent solutions that should be explored in
order to gradually unlock the present situation.
Whether we look at already existing or forecasted
Water Reserves, the following guidelines are
highly relevant. The financial solutions could be
mitigated with technical solutions including
regulated access to the Water Reserves or
Participatory Management of the pumping. The
water exploitation issues could be more strongly
linked with the water distribution ones, and
eventually with the sanitation ones (keeping in
mind that the later are generally disconnected
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from the others by most people). Exploring the
middle part of the flowchart would enable more
‘consensual’ stakeholders to participate in
negotiations that are presently dominated by more
extremist views. Management issues on the
existing Water Reserves (Bonriki and Buota) and
implementation issues on the forecasted ones
(Abatao and Tabiteuea) are inherently
interrelated. On one side, creating new Water
Reserves without confronting the actual problems
on the existing ones is not viable. On the other
side, the introduction of new actors in the debate
helps reducing the actual bipolar confrontation
between landowners and the Government on the
existing Water Reserves.
4.

Hence, it was highly recommended that the next
steps involve a sequential process for interactions.
First, experts from the relevant Government
Agencies should be confronted with a new
version of the computer-based simulator,
including most of the options present in the
existing flowchart. The experts would help
selecting affordable scenarios for the government
and tuning the parameters. Then, these scenarios
should be presented in the different villages
through collective meetings where people would
have the opportunity to interact with the computer
simulations. Evaluation of the Government
criteria and scenarios would lead to the creation
of newly modified ones. At last, the Government
experts and the island’s representatives should
meet again to assess the remaining options and
hopefully agree on an equitable management
scenario.

Discussion and Perspectives

4.1 Instant debriefing

4.2 Distant debriefing

At the end of the 2-day workshop, the project
team held what we called an “instant debriefing”.
Beyond our satisfaction of having conducted a
playful and fruitful exercise, our analysis focused
on the ways to transform the scenario-flowchart
into a viable road map for the Government.
Careful study of the memos (videos, notes, and
game spreadsheets) revealed the existence of two
types of strategic behaviour among players that
would strongly influence the outcomes:

End of May 2004, the project team came back to
Tarawa in order to implement the aforementioned
strategy. Unfortunately, soon after arrival, we
were informed that the SAPHE-Steering
Committee had decided to organize meetings with
the local communities on Tabiteuea and Abatao.
The official objective of these meetings was to
present the design of the pumping galleries to the
local residents and to seek for their agreement in
principle. During separate meetings with
members of the Steering Committee, the project
team tried to underline the inherent risk linked to
this hasty decision:

Final discussions around the flowchart were
highjacked by a minority of pseudo-players.
These were local stakeholders who came with a
strong agenda in mind and tried to enforce their
views throughout the game. As requested, they
were indeed outspoken representatives but not
prepared to compromise. The RPG failed
modifying their position and, for example, they
locked the discussions into endless arguing about
financial compensations. However, the game
helped more consensual players to take some
distance from these extremist views and to
advocate a more flexible approach of the future
negotiations.

The SAPHE-Steering Committee relied on a
design extracted from a technical report
(Falkland, 2003) that was not meant to be a final
blue-print for implementation. The report
carefully investigated the hydro-geological
conditions prevailing on Abatao and Tabiteuea
and provided some guidance in terms of
positioning (distance to actual settlements). There
was no mention of landownership issues,
demographic growth or pollution control.

On the contrary, some representatives of
Government agencies appeared to be virtualplayers, without any mandate for decision back to
their home institution. As previously mentioned,
only one player was part of the SAPHE Steering
Committee, all others were not directly involved
in the decision-making process regarding the
water reserves issues. These players played a fair
game but hardly attempted to defend their
Agency’s policy. Hence, the RPG was only
perceived as a mere exercise of communication.

The SAPHE-Steering Committee was not yet able
to provide complete information to the local
communities about financial arrangements, land
use constraints or other compensation claims
eventually raised by some local residents.
Beyond, the local negotiation issue, these
elements are instrumental in evaluating the
economic viability of such a technological option.
Falkland (2003) was very cautious regarding this
specific aspect in his recommendations. The
SAPHE-Steering Committee didn’t take into
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account the outcomes of the Role Playing Game
Workshop that provided a tentative “road map”
for further negotiations, including financial and
technical aspects. It was obvious that an upfront
confrontation would re-ignite the “water lease”
issue. Beside, the present state of mind of a
majority of residents on Abatao needed to be dealt
cautiously with in order to avoid any more
damages. Despite the concerns above, the SAPHE
meetings were confirmed but the Steering
Committee accepted our project team to attend the
meetings as observers. As expected, the meetings
held in Tabiteuea and Abatao would have
benefited from a careful analysis and better
understanding of the outcomes of the Role
Playing Game workshop. Whether they agreed or
not with the water reserve, local residents
constantly referred to our final flowchart. These
meetings resulted in a back-stepping and sterile
process where a majority of local residents
focused again on the financial aspects of the
question.

frustrated as usual. An interesting final twist is the
actual willingness of PUB to resume collaboration
with our research team in order to develop a more
participatory approach in the future. This struggle
between
centralized
and
decentralized
management is epitomized in the concept of
polycentric institutions developed by Ostrom in
her most recent work (2004). Technical agencies like PUB – very often rely on deductive scientific
approaches to reach outcomes that would need
more inductive and flexible solutions. But
flexibility means that one must assume some
uncertainty during the implementation and give
up hope on deterministic and predictable solutions
(Bradshaw and Borchers, 2000). What is true at
the technical level becomes paramount at the
political one.
Hence, there is a need for integrating not only the
participation, but more importantly the
engagement of local communities in projects that
concern their future. Following Aslin and Brown
(2004), we argue that local communities need to
be involved not only in the analysis of the results
(consultation) or the choice of the possible
scenarios (participation), but in the knowledge
creation itself (engagement). This is the postnormal way chosen, for example, by colleagues
working on Companion Modelling approaches
(Bousquet et al., 2002).
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The reason of this seemingly backlash from the
Steering Committee is partly to be found in the
absence of crucial meta-players during the RPG
sessions. The Asian Development Bank (ADB),
the Project Contractor, and the Government
Cabinet control the financial, technical, and
political agendas of the SAPHE project. One year
to the end of the loan-based project, technical
delivery from the contractor became essential in
order to secure the last payments and to turn on
the loan reimbursement countdown. At the
political level, the Cabinet was entangled in
multiple discussions with the ADB and other
funding agencies. As a matter of fact, the Steering
Committee, instead of being a driving force, had
become an arena for external and conflicting
pressures.

6.
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